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By Ismael Hossein-zadeh 
There is strong evidence that as the Bush administration is mulling over plans to 
bomb Iran, the simmering conflict between the high-ranking military professionals 
and the militaristic civilian leaders is bursting into open. The conflict, festering ever 
since the invasion of Iraq, has now been heightened over the administration's policy 
of an aerial military strike against Iran. While civilian militarists, headed by Vice 
President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, are said to have drawn plans 
to bomb Iran, senior commanders are openly questioning the wisdom of such plans. 
[1]  
 
The administration's recent statements that it is now willing to negotiate with Iran 
might appear as a change or modification of its plans to launch a military strike 
against that country. But a closer reading of those statements indicates otherwise: 
such pronouncements are premised on the condition that, as President Bush recently 
put it, "the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment." In 
light of the fact that suspension of uranium enrichment, which is nothing beyond 
Iran's legitimate rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is supposed to be 
the main point of negotiation, Iran is asked, in effect, "to concede the main point of 
the negotiations before they started." [2]  
 
Military professionals question the administration's plans of a bombing campaign 
against Iran on a number of grounds. For one thing, they doubt that, beyond a lot of 
death and destruction, the projected bombing raids can accomplish much, i.e., 
destroy Iran's nuclear program. For another, they caution that the bombing 
campaign could be very costly in terms of military, economic, and geopolitical 
interests of the United States in the region and beyond. More importantly, however, 
the professionals' opposition to the administration's bombing plans stems from the 
fact that, points out the renowned investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, "American 
and European intelligence agencies have not found specific evidence of clandestine 
[nuclear] activities or hidden facilities" in Iran. Hersh further writes, "A former senior 
intelligence official told me that people in the Pentagon were asking, 'What's the 
evidence? We've got a million tentacles out there, overt and covert, and these guys'-
the Iranians-'have been working on this for eighteen years, and we have nothing? 
We're coming up with jack shit.'" [3]  
 
So far, the jingoistic civilian leaders do not seem to have been swayed by the expert 
advice of their military experts. And the discord over Iran policy continues.  
 
Some observers have attributed the conflict to Rumsfeld's uneasy relationship with 
the military hierarchy, arguing that his cavalier attitude and unwillingness to accept 
responsibility are the main reasons for the ongoing friction between the military and 
civilian leadership. While there are clear elements of truth to this explanation, it 
leaves out some more fundamental reasons for the discord. There is a deeper and 
more general historical pattern-often shaped by the economics of war-to the 
recurring disagreements between the military and militaristic civilian leaders over 
issues of war and peace. Let me elaborate on this point.  
 
Evidence shows that business or economic beneficiaries of war, who do not have to 
face direct combat and death, tend to be more jingoistic than professional military 
personnel who will have to face the horrors of warfare. Furthermore, military 
professionals tend to care more about the outcome of a war and "military honor" 
than civilian leaders who often represent some powerful economic interests that 
benefit from the business of war. Calling such business and/or ideologically-driven 
war mongers "civilian militarists," military historian Alfred Vagts points to a number 
of historical instances of how civilian militarists' eagerness to use military force for 
their nefarious interests often led "to an intensification of the horrors of warfare." For 
example, he points out how in World War II "civilians not only anticipated war more 
eagerly than the professionals, but played a principal part in making combat . . . 
more terrible than was the current military wont or habit." [4]  
 
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq serves as another blatant example of civilian 
militarists' instigation of war in pursuit of economic and geopolitical gains. A number 
of belatedly surfaced documents reveal that not only were the civilian militarists, 
representing powerful business and geopolitical interests, behind the invasion of 
Iraq, but that they also advocated a prolonged occupation of that country in order to 
avail their legal and economic "experts" the time needed to overhaul that country's 
economy according to a restructuring plan that they had drawn up long before the 
invasion. One such document, titled "Moving the Iraqi Economy from Recovery to 
Growth," was obtained from the State Department by the well-known investigative 
reporter Greg Palast. The document, also called the "Economy Plan," was part of a 
largely secret program called "The Iraq Strategy."  
 
Here is how Palast describes the plan: "The Economy Plan goes boldly where no 
invasion plan has gone before: the complete rewrite, it says, of a conquered state's 
'policies, laws and regulations.' Here's what you'll find in the Plan: a highly detailed 
program . . . for imposing a new regime of low taxes on big business, and quick 
sales of Iraq's banks and bridges-in fact, 'ALL state enterprises'-to foreign operators. 
. . . Beginning on page 73, the secret drafters emphasized that Iraq would have to 
'privatize' (i.e., sell off) its 'oil and supporting industries.'" [5]  
 
After a detailed account and analysis of the plan, Palast concludes, "If the Economy 
Plan reads like a Christmas wish-list drafted by U.S. corporate lobbyists, that's 
because it was. From slashing taxes to wiping away Iraq's tariffs (taxes on imports of 
U.S. and other foreign goods), the package carries the unmistakable fingerprints of 
the small, soft hands of Grover Norquist."  
 
Grover Norquist, once registered as a lobbyist for Microsoft and American Express, is 
one of many corporate lobbyists who helped shape the Economy Plan for the "new" 
Iraq. In an interview with Palast, Norquist boasted of moving freely at the Treasury, 
Defense and State Departments, and in the White House, "shaping the post-
conquest economic plans...."  
 
The Economy Plan's "Annex D" laid out "a strict 360-day schedule for the free-
market makeover of Iraq." But General Jay Garner, the initially-designated ruler of 
Iraq, had promised Iraqis they would have free and fair elections as soon as Saddam 
was toppled, preferably within 90 days. In the face of this conflict, civilian militarists 
of the Bush administration overruled General Garner: elections were postponed-as 
usual, on grounds that the local population and/or conditions were not yet ripe for 
elections. The real reason for the postponement, however, was that, as Palast points 
out, "It was simply inconceivable that any popularly elected government would let 
America write its laws and auction off the nation's crown jewel, its petroleum 
industry."  
 
When Palast asked lobbyist Norquist about the postponement of the elections, he 
responded matter of factly: "The right to trade, property rights, these things are not 
to be determined by some democratic election." The troops would simply have to 
wait longer.  
 
General Garner's resistance to the plan to postpone the elections was a major factor 
for his sudden replacement with Paul Bremmer who, having served as managing 
director of Kissinger Associates, better understood the corporate culture. Soon after 
assuming power in Saddam Hussein's old palace, Bremmer cancelled Garner's 
scheduled meeting of Iraq's tribal leaders that was called to plan national elections. 
Instead, he appointed the entire "government" himself. National elections, Bremmer 
pronounced, would have to wait until 2005. "The delay would, incidentally, provide," 
Palast notes, "time needed to lock in the laws, regulations and irreversible sales of 
assets in accordance with the Economy Plan. . . . Altogether, the leader of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority issued exactly 100 orders that remade Iraq in the 
image of the Economy Plan."  
 
Palast's report is by no means an isolated or exceptional story. It is part of a 
historical pattern of how or why civilian militarists, often representing powerful 
interests of the beneficiaries of war, tend to be more belligerent than the 
professional military. The report also shows that, contrary to popular perceptions, 
the jingoistic neoconservative forces in and around the Bush administration are not 
simply a bunch of starry-eyed ideologues bent on "spreading U.S. values." More 
importantly, they represent influential economic and geopolitical interests that are 
camouflaged behind the façade of the neoconservatives' rhetoric and their alleged 
ideals of democracy.  
 
There is clear evidence that the leading neoconservative figures have been long-time 
political activists who have worked through a network of war-mongering think tanks 
that are set up to serve either as the armaments lobby or the Israeli lobby or both. 
These corporate-backed militaristic think tanks include Project for the New American 
Century, the American Enterprise Institute, Center for Security Policy, Middle East 
Media Research Institute, Middle East Forum, Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, and National Institute for Public 
Policy. Major components of the Bush administration's foreign policy, including the 
war on Iraq, have been designed largely at the drawing boards of these think thanks, 
often in collaboration, directly or indirectly, with the Pentagon and the arms lobby. 
[6]  
 
Even a cursory look at the records of these militaristic think tanks-their membership, 
their financial sources, their institutional structures, and the like-shows that they are 
set up to essentially serve as institutional fronts to camouflage the dubious 
relationship between the Pentagon, its major contractors, and the Israeli lobby, on 
the one hand, and the war-mongering neoconservative politicians, on the other. 
More critically, this unsavory relationship also shows that powerful interests that 
benefit from war are also essentially the same powers that can-and indeed do-make 
war. Additionally, it explains why civilian militarists are so eager to foment war and 
international tensions.  
 
By the same token, the incestuous relationship between war beneficiaries and war 
makers goes some way to explain the increasing tensions between the military and 
civilian militarists in and around the Bush administration, especially in the context of 
the administration's plans to bomb Iran. When contemplating war plans, military 
commanders make some critically important decisions that seem to be of no or very 
little significance to civilian leaders. Not only the military will have to face direct 
combat, death, and destruction, but perhaps more importantly, the commanders will 
have to think very carefully about the outcome of the war and the chances of victory, 
that is, the of honor and pride of the military.  
 
By contrast, the primary concern and the measure of success for civilian militarists 
lie in the mere act or continuation of war, as this would ensure increased military 
spending and higher dividends for military industries and war-induced businesses. In 
other words, the standard of success for corporate beneficiaries of war, which 
operate from behind the façade of neoconservative forces in and around the Bush 
administration, is based more on business profitability than on the conventional 
military success on the battle field. This is a clear indication of the fact that, for 
example, while from a military point of view the war on Iraq has been a fiasco, from 
the standpoint of the powerful beneficiaries of the Pentagon budget it has been a 
boon and a huge success. This explains, perhaps more than anything ales, the 
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